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SUMMARYIn sharp contrast with the post-war period, over the last 10
years income per head in the EU has begun to decline in comparison to
that of the US.   Against this background, the revival of growth and pro-
ductivity has become an overriding priority of European policymakers.
While fostering innovation has become a necessity in Europe, R&D
investments alone will not do the job. 
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To get back on a high growth path,
Europe needs a comprehensive and
coherent strategy which also involves:
(i) more competition and entry on the
product markets; (ii) more investment in
higher education; (iii) more developed
financial sectors and markets and more
flexible labour markets; (iv) a more pro-
active macroeconomic policy over the
business cycle. Finally, there should be
a clearer recognition that structural
reforms may entail winners and losers;
hence the importance of complementary
policies aimed at correcting the inequali-
ties caused by these reforms.
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Entry Rate of Foreign Firms in the Market
UK firms data (1987-93) shows that
entry has a more positive effect on
productivity growth in industries
close to the technological frontierA  PRIMER ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH
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tition in the product market; large
firms financed by banks and by
government subsidies; educatio-
nal systems emphasising primary,
secondary, and specialised under-
graduate education; and rigid
labour markets that favoured the
accumulation of experience within
firms over mobility
across firms.
However, by the late
1980s, the advanced
European countries had
largely caught up with
the world’s best perfor-
mers in terms of the
capital-labour ratio and
productivity levels: they
were reaching the world
technology frontier.
This in turn implied that Europe had
largely exhausted capital accumu-
lation and technological imitation
as its main sources of growth, and
had to turn to an alternative
source, namely innovation; that is,
the ability for firms and workers to
move rapidly into new activities or
to improve production processes. 
In the meantime, the IT revolution
resulted in a revival of US growth in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Since Europe did not have the insti-
tutions and policies to benefit from
this new technological revolution,
the result was a reversal of
Europe's approach to the frontier.
A first way to foster innovation is
thus to invest more in R&D. As we
all know, EU15 countries have
been investing, on average, about
1.9% of their GDP in R&D in the last
decade, against 2.6% in the US.
That R&D investment becomes
more essential when industries
move closer to their technological
frontier is evident when one analy-
ses the relationship between the
distance to the frontier and R&D
intensity at the industry level.
Some industries are evidently
more R&D intensive than others.
OVERthe last ten years, the average
annual growth of GDP per capita in
the EU15 has been 0.4 percentage
points below that of the US. The gap
may not seem large, but cumulated
over long periods, such small gaps
end up producing large differences
in income per capita. Furthermore,
this gap implies that, in sharp
contrast with the previous decades
where per capita GDP growth was
much higher in Europe than in the
US, in the last decade income per
head in the EU has begun to decline
in comparison to that of the US. 
Against this background, the revival
of growth and productivity has
understandably become an overri-
ding priority of European policyma-
kers. But how can we explain this
change of fortune and reverse the
trend? Classical growth theories do
not have much to tell us on this
question. Indeed these theories
emphasise capital accumulation
and savings rates as the engines of
growth. However, in spite of the US
investment revival of the last fifteen
years, both the capital-labour ratio
and the investment rate are still
higher in Europe than in the US.
Europe may need to renew its capi-
tal stock, but it is hard to claim that
its growth performance primarily
results from underinvestment in
physical capital.  
An alternative explanation, which
underlies the so-called Lisbon
Agenda, is that Europe has not
invested enough in research and
development (R&D) nor in the
knowledge economy. As a result,
the region has not been able to take
full advantage of recent technologi-
cal revolutions, particularly in infor-
mation and telecommunications.
The Lisbon objectives in this respect
are far from being met and high sus-
tainable growth still remains a chal-
lenge for EU countries. But why is it
that technology and R&D have sud-
denly become so important? 
Another frequently mentioned pos-
sibility is that Europe has failed to
reform overregulated labour and
product markets. There is indeed a
sharp contrast between the US and
EU countries in terms of product
and labour markets regulation, but
again, this contrast has been there
for a long time – it was already
apparent when
Europe was growing
much faster than the
US. 
Finally, macroecono-
mic policy is someti-
mes blamed for
being too restrictive.
But while there have
been episodes of fis-
cal consolidation
and monetary tight-
ness, the overall policy has not been
overly restrictive in recent years. 
There is, therefore, a puzzle about
the deterioration of Europe’s growth
performance. The purpose of this
note is to identify the main reasons
for this deterioration and to suggest
ways to reverse it.
Section 1 looks at the importance
of innovation for EU countries;
Section 2 examines indirect means
of fostering both innovation and
growth; and Section 3 draws some
policy conclusions.
1. INNOVATION: A NECESSITY
In 1945, Europe's stock of physical
capital had been largely destroyed
and its technological knowledge,
as reflected by its average level of
per capita GDP, was far behind the
per capita GDP in the US. So, at that
time, what Europe needed to do to
grow was essentially to accumu-
late capital and to imitate or adapt
technological innovations made
elsewhere. And this is what Europe
did quite successfully during the
trente glorieuses, with the support
of economic institutions and poli-
cies that were adapted to those
goals, in particular: limited compe-
‘By  the late 1980s,
Europe had largely
exhausted capital
accumulation and
technological imita-
tion as its main sour-
ces of growth.’A  PRIMER ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH
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1For more details, see
Rachel Griffith, Stephen
Redding, and John Van
Reenen (2004).
2More detailed empirical
results are available
from the author upon
request.
3André Sapir et al
(2004).
4Ibid.
frontier, EU countries should invest
more in R&D – and within the EU,
the most advanced countries
should invest proportionally more
as they benefit from a higher pro-
ductivity of R&D. 
However, it would be naive to
assume that patent protection and
R&D subsidies would be sufficient
to foster innovation and producti-
vity growth. It is not enough to
invest more in R&D here and there
to get the economy to grow faster.
In the same way that R&D beco-
mes essential when an economy
develops, it becomes vital to create
the micro and macro-economic
conditions for innovation-based
growth. In the remaining part of
this policy brief, we point at several
such conditions: competition and
entry, education, efficient labour
markets, financial development,
and the conduct of macroeconomic
(particularly fiscal) policy over the
business cycle. These are indirect
ways to foster innovation and
growth in maturing economies.
2. FOUR WAYS OF FOSTERING
INNOVATION & GROWTH 
(i)COMPETITON & MARKET ENTRY
As stressed by the Sapir report
3,
competition policy in Europe has
emphasised competition among
incumbent firms, but paid insuffi-
cient attention to entry. Entry, as
well as exit and turnover of firms,
are more important in the United
States than Europe. For example,
50% of new pharmaceutical pro-
ducts are introduced by firms that
are less than 10 years old in the
United States, versus only 10% in
Europe. Similarly, 12% of the lar-
gest US firms by market capitalisa-
tion at the end of the 1990s had
been founded less than twenty
years before, against only 4% in
Europe, and the difference bet-
ween US and European turnover
rates is much bigger if one consi-
ders the top 500 firms
4.
The higher entry costs and lower
degree of turnover in Europe com-
pared to those in the US are an
But, in fact, R&D intensity increa-
ses in all industries when an eco-
nomy gets closer to the technologi-
cal frontier, because the survival
and growth of all industries in a
high-cost, high-productivity eco-
nomy depends on their ability to
innovate. Thus, for example, phar-
maceuticals are more R&D inten-
sive than clothing, but both sectors
are more R&D intensive in a deve-
loped economy than in a catching-
up economy (Box 1).
Thus, now that they have moved
closer to the world technological
BOX 1
PROXIMITY TO THE TECHNOLOGICAL FRONTIER AND R&D INTENSITY AT INDUSTRY LEVEL
Let us define "proximity to the technological frontier" for an industry iin a given country at a given time – PTF – as
the ratio of TFP (total factor productivity) in that industry and the highest TFP in industry iat time tamong all coun-
tries. Proximity varies from zero (for very inefficient industries) to 1 (for the most efficient). We obtain estimates of
the proximity to the frontier, as well as data on R&D intensity (R&D divided by sales), for the years 1974-1990
1.
Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between the proximity to the frontier and R&D intensity. All columns show
a significant positive correlation between these two measures: industries closer to their respective frontier are more
R&D intensive. Moreover, as further empirical work shows, as an industry approaches the world technology frontier
more rapidly than others, it becomes relatively more R&D intensive
2. These results are consistent with the view that
R&D gains in importance as industries or countries approach the world technology frontier.
Table 1
R&D Intensity Increases as Industries Get Closer to the Frontier
SPECIFICATIONS
(1) (2) (3)
Proximity  to the frontier 0.031 0.018 0.009
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Country dummies NO YES YES
Industry dummies NO YES YES
Country-Industry dummies NO NO YES
No. of observations 1801 1801 1801
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the ratio of R&D added at the industry level
Source: Acemoglu, Aghion & Zilibotti (2006)
‘It is not enough to
invest more in R&D
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5See Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003).
6See “Education at a
Glance”, OECD (2006).
important part of the explanation for
the differences in growth patterns
between the two
continents. While
churning, (i.e. the
replacement of old,
less efficient firms
by new, innovative
ones) plays an
important part in US
productivity
growth, most pro-
ductivity gains in
Europe take place
within existing firms, as shown by
Guiseppe Nicoletti and Stefano
Scarpetta
5.
What frequently fails to be realised,
however, is that the economic costs
of less dynamic firm demographics
actually rises as the economy gets
closer to the technological frontier.
This is shown in Figure 1, where we
look at patenting rates within a panel
of UK manufacturing firms over the
period 1973-1992 as a function of
the degree of competition in the
industry.
In general, there is an inverted-U rela-
tionship between competition and
innovation: firms have little incentive
to innovate if they are not stimulated
by competition, but too much com-
petition discourages innovation as
firms are not able to reap
the benefits of their
efforts. There is, there-
fore, an optimal degree of
competition.  
What Figure 1 shows is
that if we restrict the set
of industries to those that
are closer to their world
technological frontier, the
upward sloping part of
the inverted-U relationship between
competition and innovation is stee-
per than for the whole sample. Thus,
the cost in terms of innovation, of
having too little competition, grows
as the economy develops and gets
closer to the frontier. 
What is true for competition is also
true for entry. Figure 2, again based
on firm-level UK panel data over the
period 1987-1993, shows that entry
has a more positive effect on produc-
tivity growth in industries that are
close to the technological frontier
than in those that are not.
During the immediate post-war
period, the European (or Japanese
and Korean) firms were predomi-
nantly technological laggards, whose
catching-up could have been dimini-
shed by very intense competition.
Thus, for some time, the relatively
non-competitive nature of European
markets was favourable to producti-
vity growth in European firms.
However, as Europe approached the
global technological frontier, competi-
tion and entry have become increa-
singly important catalysts for innova-
tion and productivity growth.
Entry Rate of Foreign Firms in the Market Degree of Competition
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Griffith, Howitt (2005)
Source: Aghion, Blundell, Griffith,
Howitt, Prantl (2006)
(ii)INVEST IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Is the European education system
growth-maximising? A first look at
the US versus the EU in 2004
shows that 39% of the US popula-
tion aged 25-64 had attained ter-
tiary education, against only 23%
of the EU population. This educatio-
nal attainment comparison is mir-
rored by that of tertiary education
expenditure, with the US devoting
2.3% of its GDP to tertiary educa-
tion versus only 1.3% in the EU
(2003)
6.
Is this European deficit in tertiary
education investment a big deal for
growth? The answer is a clear ‘yes’
if one takes the view that higher
education investment increases a
country's ability to make leading-
Industries farther below frontier
‘The cost in terms of
innovation, of having
too little competition
grows as the economy
gets closer to the fron-
tier.’A  PRIMER ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH
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7Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir
(2006)
8Aghion, Boustan,
Hoxby and
Vandenbussche
(2005).
BOX 2
EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH
Using annual panel data on growth and education spending and attainment by state over the period 1970-
2000, Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche regress productivity growth during a ten year period in a
state, over the composition of education spending on the cohort that just reaches working age, respectively for
frontier States and far-from-frontier States.  They instrument education spending as follows:
(i) For Research-University education, they look at whether a state has a congressman on the appro
priations committee which allocates funds for research universities but not  other types of schools;
(ii) For “low-brow” post-secondary education (community colleges, training schools), they look at 
whether the chairman of the state’s education committee represents voters whose children attend 
one or two-year post-secondary institutions.
The first stage regressions yield the result that every additional representative on the House Appropriation
Committee increases the expenditure on reseach-type education by $597 per cohort member, which is condi-
serable.  In second-stage regressions the authors find that an additional $1000 per person in research educa-
tion spending raises the state’s per-employee growth rate by 0.27% if the state is at the frontier, whereas it rai-
ses it by only 0.09% if the state is far from the frontier.  Finally, migration reinforces the extent to which inves-
ting in higher education is more growth-enhancing for a state which is closer to the frontier: students with col-
lege degrees are more likely to defect to a frontier state if they are born in a state which is far from the frontier.
This will benefit growth in the recipient state, but not in the state of origin.
Source: Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2005)
Fig. 3
Long-term growth effects of $1000 per person spending on education, US States
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edge innovations, whereas pri-
mary and secondary education are
more likely to make a difference in
terms of the country's ability to
implement existing technologies.
This view is supported by recent
empirical evidence, both across
countries
7 and across US States
8.
Both studies show that the closer a
country’s or a State’s productivity is
to the frontier productivity, the more
growth-enhancing it is to invest in
higher (in particular post-graduate)
education. In countries or States
that are further below the frontier,
growth is primarily enhanced by
investments in primary, secondary,
and undergraduate education (Box
2). Thus, as Europe has moved clo-
ser to the world technological fron-
tier, it should invest more in tertiary
education in order to increase its
innovative potential.
For Europe, putting the emphasis
on primary/secondary education
was fine as long as the continent
was technologically far from the US
and therefore relying more on imi-
tation as a main source of growth;
but now that the growth potential
of imitation is wearing out, it beco-
mes more urgent to invest more in
higher education in order to foster
innovation. Evidence actually
shows that the IT and globalisation
waves of the 1980s have further
increased the growth potential of
higher education investment in all
OECD countries.
Without mobility
With mobility
States at the frontier States distant from frontier
Research type 
education
Two years college 
education
Research type 
education
Two years college 
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8Aghion, Fally and
Scarpetta (2006).
9To minimize the scope
for endogeneity pro-
blems, AFS uses indus-
try-level indicators (the
dependence on external
finance of the corres-
ponding sector in the
US or the capital labour
ratio in the sector) to
differentiate the effect
of credit constraints on
entry and the post-
entry growth of firms
after six years into the
market, across indus-
tries.
10Negative but statisti-
cally insignificant.
(iii)REFORM CREDIT MARKETS NOT
JUST LABOUR MARKETS
Both credit constraints and labour
market rigidities are likely to act as
barriers to entry and innovation.
Credit constrained firms may not
be able to pay the required fixed
costs to enter new markets or
introduce new production techno-
logy. And labour market rigidities
should make it harder for a firm to
move to a new activity, as it will be
more costly to find new workers
adapted to that activity and to
reduce employment in the old acti-
vity.    
As it turns out, labour market rigidi-
ties are often presented as the
main impediment to firms' entry,
mobility and post-entry growth,
whereas financial constraints are
considered to be less important. A
recent study
8 provides the oppo-
site picture, however. This latter
work looks at firms from 14 OECD
countries over the 1990s, and exa-
mines how the entry of new firms
and their post-entry growth are
affected by three factors: 1) finan-
cial development; 2) regulations
affecting start-up costs; and 3)
regulations on the hiring and firing
of workers. 
Financial development is measu-
red either by the ratio of private
credit to GDP or the ratio of stock
market capitalisation to GDP. Start-
up costs and restrictions on firing
are measured by the correspon-
ding OECD indicators.
9 The main
finding from this research is that
financial development facilitates
the entry of small firms especially
in sectors which in the US rely more
on external finance. In these sec-
tors, however, labour market regu-
lations do not inhibit the entry of
smaller firms (although they do for
larger firms).  
Table 2 summarises the relative
impacts of financial development
and labour market regulations on
the growth of a new firm in its first
years of existence (post-entry
growth). In the table, financial
development is interacted with the
sector’s dependence on external
financing; and employment protec-
tion legislation is interacted with
the sector’s labour intensity (mea-
sured by the labour-capital ratio).
Financial develop-
ment is further
decomposed into pri-
vate credit and stock
market capitalisa-
tion. 
The table shows that
financial develop-
ment facilitates the
post entry growth of
firms in sectors that
are intrinsically more dependent
upon external financing. In
contrast, labour market regula-
tions do not seem to be signifi-
cantly correlated with post-entry
growth of firms. These results sug-
gest that political reformers in the
EU should go beyond labour regula-
tions and also emphasise financial
development: on average, the ratio
of private credit to GDP is far lower
in the EU (0.76) than in the US
(1.32), and this gap is even bigger
if we look at stock market capitali-
sation indexes or at venture capital
indicators.
Table 2
Financial Development Favours Entry
Impact of selected interactions on post-entry growth
Fin. development x dependence on external financing POSITIVE
Credit Development x external financing POSITIVE
Stock market development x external financing POSITIVE
Employment protection legislation x labour intensity INSIGNIFICANT
10
Source: Aghion, Fally, Scarpetta (2006)
(iv)MANAGE THE ECONOMIC CYCLE
There is currently a debate about
the conduct of macroeconomic
policy in the euro area. It has been
noticed that structural budget defi-
cits and short-term interest rates
fluctuate much less over the cycle
in the EMU zone than in the US and
UK, and some poli-
cymakers have rai-
sed the concern
that this in turn
may inhibit growth
in the euro area. Are
these concerns at
all justified?
This depends on
whether firms can
borrow enough
funds to maintain their R&D invest-
ments during bad times and, there-
fore, throughout the cycle. If they
can, the best would be, at least
from a growth perspective, to
recommend that governments do
not intervene over the business
cycle, and instead let markets ope-
rate.
However, the prescription might be
quite different when credit market
imperfections prevent firms from
borrowing enough in recessions.
For example, suppose that the bor-
rowing capacity of firms is propor-
tional to their current earnings. In a
recession, current earnings are
reduced and so, therefore, is firms’
ability to borrow in order to main-
tain R&D investments. In this case,
a countercyclical policy will foster
innovation and growth by reducing
the negative consequences of a
recession (or a bad aggregate
shock) on firms' innovative invest-
‘Political reformers in
the EU should go
beyond labour regula-
tions and also empha-
sise financial develop-
ment.’
‘If firms can borrow
enough funds to main-
tain their R&D invest-
ments throughout the
business cycle, govern-
ments should let mar-
kets operate.’A  PRIMER ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH
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cyclicality is less detrimental to
growth in countries with a higher
degree of financial development.
One can also show that if public
debt growth in the EMU zone were
to become as countercyclical as in
the US, long-term growth in the
eurozone could increase signifi-
cantly, possibly by the order of
magnitude of half a percentage
point
11. 
Moreover, it is the investment part
of government spending that
appears to drive this positive effect
of budget countercyclicality.
Budgetary policies are currently far
less countercyclical in the EU than
in the US even though the US is
more financially developed than
the EU. As shown in Figure 4 below,
both the structural deficit and the
real interest rates vary much less
over time in the euro area than in
the US. Our discussion suggests
that the absence of an active (or
reactive) macroeconomic policy in
the euro area is, therefore, a poten-
tial source of the growth deficit in
the region. 
ments. For example, the govern-
ment may decide to increase the
volume of its public investments,
thereby fostering the demand for
private firms' products. Or the
government may choose to lower
taxes on private enterprises, the-
reby increasing their liquidity hol-
dings and thus making it easier for
firms to face idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks without having to sacrifice
R&D or other types of longer-term
growth-enhancing investments.
In a recent empirical study using
annual data from 17 OECD coun-
tries, Aghion and Marinescu
(2006) show that the pro-cyclica-
lity of fiscal policy is actually detri-
mental to growth; but they also
show that the same degree of pro-
Change in government structural deficit (%GDP)
Change in government structural deficit (%GDP)
Change in government structural deficit (%GDP)
Change in government structural deficit (%GDP)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
Euro Area
UK
US
Sweden
Fig. 4
A Distinctly Less Activist Policy Mix in the Euro Area
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11Aghion and Marinescu
(2006).
‘The pro-cyclicality
of fiscal policy is
actually detrimental
to growth.’ment. But the coherence must
also be between structural and
macroeconomic policies as they
become more proactive over the
business cycle. This coherence in
policy design is lacking in Europe
and this, more than particular fai-
lures here or there, is the main
problem to address. 
Thirdlesson: reforms entail win-
ners and losers. For example, libe-
ralising entry boosts innovation in
sectors closer to the technological
frontier but less so in sectors far
A  PRIMER ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH
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3. CONCLUSIONS
Four main lessons can be drawn
from this discussion as to how one
could best stimulate innovation
and growth in the EU area.
The firstlesson is that innovation
is a main engine of growth for
countries with already high per
capita GDP, but that one must go
beyond the obvious recommenda-
tion of increasing state spending
on, or subsidies to, R&D, and pro-
tecting intellectual property rights,
and also consider indirect chan-
nels whereby innovation can be
fostered. 
The second lesson is that innova-
tion-based growth requires com-
plementary policies. We have
emphasised here the necessary
coherence between R&D and
structural reforms and policies
such as competition, higher edu-
cation, labour market flexibility
and financial market develop-
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below the frontier; this in turn
points to the importance of com-
plementary structural policies
aimed at helping workers reallocate
from lagging to more advanced
sectors, and of policies aimed at
compensating potential short-term
losers from structural reforms.
Failing to do so might result in fur-
ther protracting the implementation
of those reforms. 
Fourth lesson: structural reforms
need careful agenda-setting and
prioritisation, based on a compara-
tive cost-benefit analysis where the
value of each reform would be mea-
sured by the ratio of its contribu-
tion to the overall growth potential
of the country over the (social)
cost of implementing the reform.
This in turn would enable us to
"rank" the reforms; that is, to get a
more precise view as to what
should be undertaken first, or as to
which reforms should be implemen-
ted jointly because of complemen-
tarities in their growth impacts.
‘Innovation-based
growth requires a cohe-
rence that is lacking in
Europe. This is the
main problem to
address.’